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THE HISTORY OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE
THOMAS BATY t
I
An article contributed to the British Year Book of International
Law for 1927 by Mr. Mootham, M. Sc., has always appeared to the
present writer so inconclusive as to demand no animadversion. But as
it seems to be on the way to be treated as an authority, and is cited, for
instance, by Dr. McDiarmid in a recent issue of .the American Journal
of International Law,' a few remarks on its propositions may not be
out of place. The subject is still a vital one, for the Civil War doctrine
of "Continuous Voyage" was the thin end of the wedge which has now
made it possible to interdict all trade with the enemy. It is the object
of the present paper to show that it was not a well-known doctrine
established since 1756.
The immediate occasion of Mr. Mootham's work appears to have
been the discovery in 1923 2 of several bundles of notes respectively
made by Doctors Nicholl and Arnold of prize causes alike in the English
Admiralty Court and on appeal therefrom. Mr. Mootham, except in a
few cases, does not cite the ipsissinma verba of these rough notes, which
he sometimes dignifies with the name of reports; and when he does,
their fragmentary and allusive character is manifest. Counsel's note is
made to assist his own memory, a memory which has a background of
t D. C. L., Queen's College, Oxford; LL. D., University College, Oxford; Legal
Adviser to Imperial Japanese Foreign Office since i916; Associate of the Intitut de
Droit Internatioial; Hon. General Secretary, International Law Association, i9o5-
i916; Barrister at Law (Inner Temple) ; author, INxTEaATIoNAL LAW (I909), BRrrAIn
AND SEA LAW (I9II), CANONS OF INTERNATIo1AL LAW (1930); The Relations of
Invaders to Inmergents (1927) 36 YALt L. J. 966; Nationality of a Married Woman
at Common Law (1936) 52 L. Q. REV. 247; and numerous other books and articles in
legal periodicals.
i. McDiarmid, Americant Civil War Precedents (,940) 34 Am. J. INT. L. 220.
2. BRIT. YEAR BK. OF I. L. (1923-4).
(127)
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multitudinous detail that cannot exist in any other brain. The danger
of relying on such memoranda is obvious.
But we need not be alarmed. The notes contain nothing to
impeach the classical doctrine on the subject of Continuous Voyage.
II
Mr. Mootham sets out to demolish the classical doctrine, and to
show that its application in order not to piece two admitted voyages
together, so as to make one "continued voyage" of them, but to regard
an inferred eventual ulterior destination of ship or goods in a supposed
future transit as a conclusive ground of condemnation, while on an
otherwise innocent voyage, is and always has been correct in principle
and followed in practice.
He is singularly unsuccessful. A lawyer surely ought to be im-
pressed by the entire absence of all cases proceeding on such a principle,
throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. He should surely
be impressed by the perfect unanimity of all English authors, includifig
such anti-neutral ones as Ward and Harcourt, throughout the nine-
teenth century, against the asserted doctrine. He should surely be
impressed by its absence from the practice of the Crimean War (with
one solitary exception 3). And he should be impressed by the yielding
of Lord Salisbury to German insistence in the case of the Bundesrath 4
at the close of that century. But all that our author observes is that
"several distinguished jurists" are against him. He mentions only
W. E. Hall,5 which seems to argue that he has not consulted the primary
source on the subject, the elaborate monographs of Sir Travers Twiss.6
Hall's condemnation of the Anerican Civil War Cases is, indeed, em-
phatic and vigorous, not to say peremptory, but it is grounded on
Twiss's work which remains the standard and reasoned authority.7
Still, Hall's opinion is worth quoting as an exordium to our re-
search. The principle according to which the English courts held that
a neutral's admitted voyage from a colony to the belligerent mother-
country was not broken by landing and reshipping the cargo at a neutral
port-the true "continuous voyage" principle-Hall says, "was seized
upon by the American Courts, and applied to cases of contraband and
blockade. Vessels were captured while on their voyage from one neu-
tral port to another, and were then condemned as carriers of contraband
or for intent to break blockade. They were thus condemned, not for
3. The Frau Howina, CALvo, Dorr INTmNATIONAL (x855) § 2676, a French case.
4. Cited in2 OPPENHEIM, IxTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1937) 675.
!. HALL, INTENATiONAL LAW (8th ed. 1924).
6. In (1877) LAW MAGAZINE A-NFD REVIEW 9, 271.
7. Corroborated as it is by L. Gessner in his JURMICIAT Rmrw oF THE SPRNG-
30K CASE.
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an act-for the act done was in itself innocent,, and no previous act
existed with which it could be connected so as to form a whole-but on
mere suspicion of intention to. do an act. Between the grounds upon
which these and the English cases were decided there was of course no
analogy." 8
Hall proceeds: "The American decisions have been universally
reprobated outside the United States, and would probably now find no
defenders in their own country." 9
Let us further cite the crucial sentence from Sir W. Scott's judg-
ment in the case of the Imina Baumann."° Spars were going to Emden,
and our bright moderns would have been certain that the neutral owners
ought to be forced to prove that they were not going to be shipped across
the water into enemy territory, four or five miles away, to fit out the
navies of Holland. Scott knew better.
"The rule respecting contraband, as I have always understood
it, is that the articles must be taken in delicto, in the actual prose-
cution of the voyage to an enemy's port."
What does Mr. Mootham do, in the face of that? He digs up
the case of the Jesus, Maria and Joseph, which had been peacefully
reposing since 1756 in Burrell's Reports,"' and points to it as "the
earliest case of the . . . doctrine of continuous voyage," careless of
the fact that, if it was, it had no companion or successor, and that it
must have been perfectly well known to Sir William Scott. But what
he does not tell us about the Jesus is that in that case the Master swore
that the voyage on which he was taken was to have ended in France! ' 2
Therefore we have a perfect case for condemnation: the primary evi-
dence shows that the voyage was one of contraband saltpetre to France.
It does not matter where the saltpetre came from, and there is not the
least necessity to invoke the doctrine of continuous voyage, for it was
an admitted single voyage. In fact, the head-note says nothing about
continuity, but states only with sweet simplicity, "Saltpetre is contra-
band of war." 13
With this unhappy beginning, Mr. Mootham proceeds to demolish
the classical doctrine. He evinces, however, no notion of the nature of
8. HAx, INT=aNATIONAL LAW (5th ed.) 668.
9. It may be added that the leading decision was one of 5 judges to 4; and that
Nelson, J., wrote subsequently that "the court was not then familiar with the Law of
blockade". He was one of the minority: Wayne, Swayne, Nelson and Clifford, JJ.
The majority consisted of Grier and Davis, JJ., and the three most recently appointed
members of the Court, Miller and Field, JJ., and Chase, C. J.
io. (i8oo) 3 Christopher Robinson's Reports (cited hereafter as C. R.) 168; often
inaccurately cited as the Initna.
ii. P. 164, sub nom. the Jesus.
12. Four other mariners corroborated him, not that it matters.
13. On appeal, the Lords, with great leniency, allowed the claimant to prove that
the master was wrong, and that the voyage was not farther than San Sebastian, where
the asserted consignee lived. But in the end the decree was sustained.
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evidence in prize proceedings, which have, according to Phillimore,
"nothing in common with those of the common law"; while Judge Story
remarks that "It is a great mistake to admit the common-law notions in
respect to evidence to prevail in proceedings which have no analogy to
those of common law." 14 Why does this peculiarity exist in prize pro-
ceedings? Very simply: in prize proceedings the belligerent is prose-
cutor, judge and jury all in one, and it was always thought unreasonable
that he should be witness too! The great Memorandum of the English,
Law Officers, Lee, Murray, Paul and Ryder 15-- called a riponse sans
r6plique,-which formed a record for all time of the nature and course
of prize proceedings in Europe (and was the basis of Judge Story's
learning in Prize), laid the principle clearly down that the evidence
must come from the captured ship. As Sir James Marriott afterwards
put it neatly, the principle is "ex ore tuo Judicaberis." 1  The ship's
papers (indeed, every scrap of paper on board, the "search" for which
constitutes the principal element in what is called "visit and search")
and the sworn answers of the ship's company to standing interroga-
tories, constitute the sole admissible evidence. It will be seen that this
is only fair, when the trial is in a hostile court, the prosecutor a power-
ful Government, and the difficulties of distance, language and expense
enormous. The ship had to be released at once, and enabled to earn
profits; the whole thing must be summary; it was a patent interfer-
ence with a friendly flag; it: must be justified up to the hilt. It was not
sufficient to give the neutral the opportunity of conducting an expensive
lawsuit (with the dice loaded against him). The means of securing
all this was to rest the whole case on the ship's own account of herself.
That may be all forgotten nowadays; but as a historian, Mr.
Mootham ought not to ignore it when dealing with the past. His essay
gives no hint that he has ever perused the Lee-Murray Memorandum, 17
or Story's writings on Prize; 18 for he quotes numerous cases which
may appear to the tyro to be cases in which an ultimate unlawful desti-
nation or origin was inferred for ships and goods whose immediate
origin and destination was lawful, but which are really cases in which
the ultimate origin or destination was apparent from the evidence of
the ship's own papers and people (the evidence "in preparatorio"). Such
14. Note to I Wheaton's Reports.
15. (1753). Probably drafted by Murray (Lord Mansfield), and reprinted with
other documents on Continuous Voyage, by the writer in PRIZE LAW AND CONTINUOUS
VOYAGE (I915).
16. See his MtmoIR JusTrTICATIF.
17. LEE, PAUL, RYDER AND MURRAY, MEmoaAL ON PRIZE PROCEDURE (REPORT
ON PROCEDURE IN PRIZE CASES) (1753) in BATY, PRIZE LAW AND CONTINUOUS VoY-
AGE (I915), cited note 15 supra.
I8. STORY, NOTES ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACricE OF PRIZE CotRS (1854).
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cases are those of the Lisette,'9 the Charlotte Sophia,20 the Maria
(Monses),21 and the Juno,22 cases of exit from a blockaded port in
lighters, where the transit of the impeached goods was accomplished in
accordance with a detailed scheme apparent on the face of the primary
e-MIence, making the nature of the voyage clear on the ship's own
showing. This the present writer pointed out forty years ago in the
first chapter of International Law in SoutA Africa.23  If the evidence
in preparatorio shows an illegal voyage, there is no reason why con-
demnation should not ensue; and in the leading case (the Maria
(Monses)) it is clear that the ship's papers did show it. "The charter-
party was made in Bremen," which was blockaded, and must have
shown the nature of the voyage. Ship, cargo and lighters were at
Bremen; ship and cargo came out separately and were combined outside.
The ship had come out from a blockaded area.2 4 The goods had
broken that blockade and were liable to confiscation; at some moment
that liability would disappear, but certainly not when they were put on
board a sea-going ship for America! All this must have been apparent
from the evidence in preparatorio. We know it must, because in the
Haabet 25 and the Glierktigheit,20 Sir Win. Scott had twice already in
this very year of Trafalgar refused, with forcible emphasis, to listen to
captors' evidence. It is inconceivable that he should have received it in
the Maria 27 without any comment or argument. The same explanation
applies to the case of the Charlotte Sophia. 28  The Lisette29 shows
exactly how the fact of the unity of the voyage came before the judge
in the regular evidence: the charter-party showed it-"a charter-party,
to take on board a cargo of goods from Malaga,3 0 which were to be sent
from the Elbe in lighters." Nothing could be more explicit; it is for-
tunate that in these very summary reports of cases, we have this of the
Lisette which happens to show exactly how the facts came before the
court. Sir William Scott speaks of the ship being taken on "a voyage
from Tonningen to Malaga, but a voyage accompanied with the fact
i9. 6 C. R. 387, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 972 (Adm. 1807).
20. 6 C. R. 204 n., z65 Eng. Rep. R. 9o2 n. (a) 2 (Adm. i8o6).
21. 6 C. R. 2o, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 9o (Adm. I8O5).
22. 2 C. R. ii6. 165 Eng. Rep. R. 258 (Adm. 1799).
23. BATY, INTmNATIONAL LAW IN SOUTH AYMRCA (1900).
24. In the Charlotte Sophia the Lords made a great point of the fact that the ship
herself had come through the blockade.
25. 6 C. R. 54, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 848 (Adm. i8o5).
26. 6 C. R. 58 n., 165 Eng. Rep. R. 849 n. (Adm. i8o5).
27. 6 C. R. 204 n. (i8o6).
28. 6 C. R. 203 08o5).
29. 6 C. R. 387, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 972 (igo6).
3o. This must certainly be a misprint for "for Malaga". The judgment (id. at 393,
I65 Eng. Rep. R. at 974) commences "This ship was taken on a voyage from Tonnin-
gen to Malaga." And the King's Advocate and Dr. Lawrence (on the same side for
once) speak of "the destination of the vessel to the enemy's port . . . the effect of
such a destination to Spain." (Id. at 388, 165 Eng. Rep. R. at 972.) Italics in the
text added.
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that she had gone from Hamburgh to Tonningen under a charter-party
formed at Hamburgh for this ulterior voyage."
A somewhat different case is presented by the Vier Gebroeders.81
It is not essentially different. Goods were captured when in transit to
Tonningen just outside the limits of the blockade of the Elbe, to be
taken on through the blockade in another and more suitable vessel. This
was held a single voyage in breach of the blockade, and the ship and
goods were condemned, although no entry had been made upon the
second part of the voyage. But how did the Court get to know that the
second part was intended? Simply because, as in the Jesus and the
Lisette, it must have been so stated in the primary evidence.
If Sir Wm. Scott had said in the Marii: "Now, I am satisfied that
these goods must have come from Bremen; the charter-party was made
there, and the goods were no part of the commerce of Varel at all. I
find they came from Bremen and I condemn the adventure," there would
have been some analogy with the American Civil War Cases. If Sir
William had said in the Vier Gebroeders, "These goods were not needed
at Tormingen; they must have been meant to go to the Elbe, where they
were needed," there would again have been some analogy with these
cases. But certainly he did nothing of the sort. The history of the
shipments is presented in the reports as a thing admitted and declared
in the ordinary evidence in the ordinary way. And if the ship's own
evidence, taken in the ordinary way, shows the unity of an intended
importation in breach of blockade, there is no reason why it should not
be acted upon.
The case is different with regard to contraband. Here, the law
requires a physical destination of the vessel to a belligerent port or
fleet so that no amount of evidence on the ship's papers and declarations
as to an intended hostile use can make the goods subject to confisca-
tion.32 Consequently, the cases which are relied on in the paper under
examination, in which the ship was hoist with her own petard, are
mainly cases of blockade. In all of them, as we have seen, there is
nothing like inference or suspicion: nothing to support the kernel of
the Civil War cases, viz., that "Intention is everything." On the con-
trary, the principle is maintained that "Objective'fact is everything."
Only when the facts prima facie condemn, can we begin to talk about
"intentions" in explanation or excuse. The Schoone Sophie 88 is highly
31. (1786). Unreported. Cited in BanI. YEAR Boox from note by Dr. Nicholl
(V. 324). Also see The Gratitudine, 3 C. R. 240, 270, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 450 (Adm.
i8oi), where it is cited.
32. It may be a question whether a destination of the goods to an enemy's fleet or
port, through the medium of transshipment to another vessel, if apparent on the ship's
papers, or the declarations of the ship's company, would be sufficient to condemn. So
far as appears, no such clear clase has ever arisen in the history of contraband.
33. 6 C. R. 138, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 878 (Adm. 18O5).
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instructive in this regard. Colonial produce was going to Antwerp
from Emden in a neutral Prussian vessel. They had evidently come
from the West Indies, and indeed from neutral St. Bartholomew (then
Swedish). It was sought "on grounds of probability and suspicion,"
to argue that they came originally from an enemy (French) island.
Sir Win. Scott declined to act on this attractive hypothesis, and refused
to order "further proof" of innocence, but restored the cargo simplic-
iter. It had lain five weeks at Emden, but that factor is not represented
as decisive. The words, "as it was argued on grounds of probability
and suspicion", are italicized in the report, suggesting that there was
something sinister, or at least peculiar, about them.
So far as the writer is aware, nobody ever was concerned to main-
tain that a voyage, admitted on the primary evidence to be prima facie
illegal, was innocent merely because it was made in two sections. What
the classical doctrine of Continuous Voyage maintains is that the voyage
must be proved-and proved on the ship's own evidence. Mr. Pares'
recent book on Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights8 4 will show to
the sceptic that seamen quite frequently did make admissions useful to
the captors. Sailors do not like their wages and liberties to be imperiled
by concealed illegal adventures.
III
It will be at once apparent how all these cases presented in the
Year Book 35 as precedents to the contrary differ from the American
cases reprobated by Gessner, Twiss and Hall. In the former, there is
a single adventure proved and documented as such on the ship's papers,
or sworn to by some of the ship's company. In the latter, there are
mere inferences of intention based on surmise and on captors' evidence.
Captors' evidence does not seem to have been admitted in the Civil War
cases: the court appears to have acted on its own suspicions, at any
rate in the Springbok.3" It was reserved for Great Britain, by the
Naval Prize Act,37 to formally adopt this illegal course of procedure.
Nor is it possible to justify this reliance on well-grounded sus-
picions and captors' evidence by adducing the precedent of the colonial
and coasting voyage cases. For there, without captors' evidence, or
surmise of any sort, the court had, on the ships' own showing, the plain
objective certainty of two facts: that the vessel was taking cargo to a
European hostile port and that she had brought it from a colony of a
34. PARFs, COLONIAL BLocADE ANm N u Jua RIGHTS (1938) 206.
35. Op. cit. supra note 2.
36. 5 Wall. 1 (U. S. 1866).
37. Naval Prize Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Gao. V, c. 13, § x.
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belligerent country.38 That was enough to condemn; but the ship went
on to say that she had played about with this cargo in an intermediate
neutral place, and the question was then whether this explanation would
be sufficient upon which to ground release. We need not here consider
the circumstances in which it was variously held that it would or would
not avail. "Further proof" was allowed to the ship as an indulgence, to
explain her real intentions regarding the shipment. But it should be
plain that the decision differs toto coelo from cases such as those of the
American Civil War, in which there was no such certain and admitted
ultimate destination. In other words, the English,court found enough
to condemn (the colonial transit), and the question of intention was
immaterial except as a possible excuse: the American courts rested the
whole case on an inferred and conjectural "intention".
With these colonial voyage cases may be classed the coasting
voyage cases which the Year Book cites. The Ebenezer 39 was an ordi-
nary case of continuous coasting voyage in which "it came out" in the
depositions, that the cargo before leaving for Antwerp had come
straight from Bordeaux with the cargo, and had spent only a pleasant
three days at Emden, the asserted port of departure. Thus the vessel
was captured on the second half of the voyage, when all the facts were
ascertained. It was the usual case of piecing together the two admitted
sailings, proceeding simply on the primary evidence. Goods had admit-
tedly come from enemy Bordeaux in the Ebenezer, and were admittedly
going in the Ebenezer to enemy Antwerp. That was a clear participa-
tion in the coasting trade of the enemy; the only question was whether
it was excused by a call at Emden. The court found that it was not
excused; and why should it have found otherwise? The Juno (18o8)
is cited merely from the rough notes of Doctor Nicholl 40 and the
meager scrap--if it may respectfully be so styled-tells us plainly that
the voyage was "From Havana to Providence and Europe"-therefore
a simple illegal colonial voyage, and there was no need to style it "con-
tinuous" merely because "it was intended to call in America". The ship
was taken, and quite properly taken, before she made that "call", on her
own admission of an illegal voyage. No doubt the charter-party was
the same as that in the Enoch,4 1 viz., "For a voyage to the colony of the
38. See Note II in the Appendix to 6 C. R. (Adm. i8o8), where the nature of the
"Continuous Voyage" principle is clearly brought out: "It was i. thW first inetance
adopted as a rule of equitable construction in favor of neutral trade." A cargo going
from Bordeaux to a French colony was allowed to show that it had really come from
Hamburg. (Italics added.) (Just so, by indulgence, the claimants in the case of the
Jesus, note 13 supra, were allowed -to show, if they could, that the shipmaster was
wrong in stating the destination of his voyage to be for France.)
39. 6 C. R. 250, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 920 (Adm. 18o6).
40. Appx. 104.
41. Discussed in the Maria, 5 C. R. 365, 370, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 8o6, 8o8 (Adm.
18o5).
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enemy, and back to America, and from thence to the Mother-Country
in Europe." In the Maria (Jackson) 42 Scott examines minutely a
variety of cases in which different circumstances were alleged to break
the continuity of an admitted voyage from a belligerent colony to the
mother-country. Given the damning fact of an admitted transit which
would, if unexplained, be illegal, the court was at liberty to accept or
refuse the excuse that there had been an intermediate call. It refused
it where there was a through charter-party,43 other writings in evi-
dence,44 instructions in evidence showing a similar course of dealing, 45
where the goods had never been landed, 46 and so forth. But, as in
the Maria (Jackson), the Eagle (Weeks) 47 and the Respect,48  it
sometimes allowed it, and admitted the claimants to make further proof
of the innocence of their conduct.49
It may be added that in his examination of the circumstances which
from time to time were considered to break the continuity of an other-
wise admitted colonial voyage, the Year Book author does not consider
it worth while to mention that the British Government in 18oi explicitly
told the United States that the payment of duties in the intermediate
port would be sufficient, as it had been so decided in the Polly (Lasky) 50
-and that the Vice-Admiralty Courts had been officially instructed in
that sense; nor that the United States were considerably astonished
when the Court of Appeal revolutionized this, and talked about disre-
garding such steps on the part of neutral merchants--"however oper-
ose"! 51 "Perhaps the mere touching in the Neutral Country to take
Fresh Clearances may properly be considered as a fraudulent evasion,
and is in effect the Direct Trade: but the High Court of Admiralty
has decided, (and I see no reason to expect that the Court of Appeal
will vary the rule) that the landing the goods and paying the duties in
the Neutral Country breaks the continuity of the voyage, and is such
an importation as legalizes the trade." So ran .the report of the King's
42. 5 C. R. 365, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 8o6 (Adm. 18o5).
43. The Enoch, discussed in the Maria, 5 C. R. 365, 370, i65 Eng. Rep. R. 8o6,
8O8 (Adm. I8O5), cited note 41 mtpra.
44. The Essex, discussed in the Maria, 5 C. R. 365, 368, i65 Eng. Rep. R. 8o6, 8o8
(Adm. 18o5); the William, 5 C. R. 385, 399, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 817, 822 (Adm. i8o6).
45. The Rowena, discussed in the Maria, 5 C. R. 365, 37o, i65 Eng. Rep. R. 8o6,
SOS (Admi. 18o5).
46. The Mercury (18o2), discussed in the William, 5 C R. 385, 400, i65 Eng.
Rep. R. 817, 823 (I8O6).
47. (I8O3). Discussed id. at 4oi, I65 Eng. Rep. R. at 823.
48. (185). Discussed in the Maria, 5 C. R. 365, 370, I65 Eng. Rep. R. 8o6, 8o8.
49. In the Maria, 5 C. R. 365, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 8o6, the proof was successful,
as also in the Eagle (Weeks), discussed in the William, 5 C. R. 385, 4oi, 165 Eng.
Rep. R. 817, 823 (1803).
50. 2 C. R. 361, 165 Eng. Rep. R 344 (I8OO).
51. See i BarT. STATX PAPERs (Monroe & Pinkney to Holland & Auckland, Aug.
2o, I8o6) 1204 and Baty, The Portland Ministry and Continuous Voyage (1922) 38
L. Q. REv. 359, where the report, as Mr. Gaskoin has pointed out, is mistakenly attrib-
uted by the present writer to Robinson instead of Nicholl.
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Advocate (Dr. Nicholl) in I8oi, and the Duke of Portland, as Prime
Minister, instructed the Admiralty to communicate it to the colonial
Courts and to the Government of the United States, who published it
broadcast. But in 1805 the American property at sea on the faith of
that publication was subjected to confiscation by the Lords of Appeal
in the case of the EsseX.52 Monroe and Pinkney complained of all this
to the British Government in 18o6, but they appear to have obtained no
redress. 3
The Year Book learned contributor's conclusions may therefore be
flatly traversed, with the partial exception of the fourth.
i. The doctrine of continuous voyage was not applied in the case
of the Jesus.
2. The doctrine with which the courts were concerned was one of
"continuous transport rather than continuous voyage": they did not
look to ultimate destination beyond the completion of an admitted
voyage, shown to be one voyage by the ship's papers and the sworn
depositions of her people.
3. The doctrine of requiring a person who alleged the discontinuity
of an admitted voyage to establish its innocence was familiar to the
Judges of the United Kingdom long before 18o 5. It was applied in
the Monte Criste cases 54 in the War of I756."
4. That doctrine was not first applied in 1756 to the case of contra-
band; nor in 1804 to that of blockade; nor in I8o6 to that of coasting
trade, so far as our materials serve.
In short, as was pointed out in papers read before the International
Law Association at Christiania in 1905 and London in I9IO, the neutral
merchant, through the distortion of the doctrine, has in the twentieth
century exchanged his clean habeas corpus for a ruinous process of
common law litigation. Non-lawyers like the late honored Professor
Garner may be content with this, but those who are anxious to see the
affairs of nations regulated on a basis of law and order may well think
otherwise.
52. See note 44 mpra.
53. 1 BRIT. STATE PAPRs 1203 et seq. Probably Scott's rule in the Polly making
the payment of duties conclusive, was rendered nugatory by a system of drawbacks.
So the departure from it is not quite as unfair as it seems. See Grant, M. R., in the
William, 5 C. R. 385, 403, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 817, 824 (I8O6), referring to the Essex.
54. Discussed in 4 C. R. Appendix 5, reporting the case of the Wilhelnina.
55. It is in fact inherent in the theory of prize procedure, according to which a
claimant who is on the evidence liable to condemnation may be allowed to explain him-
self. See BATY, Lee-Murray Memorial in PRszE LAW AND CONTINUOUS VOYAGE
(1915) 116.
See also the Wilhelmina, 2 C. R. io, n. (I8OI), cited from Dr. Nicholl's Notes
by Mr. Gaskoin in Prise Case Notes in the Days of Stowell (923) BaRnsH YEAR
BOOK OF INTRNATiONAL LAW 89. (The writer is indebted to him for his kind correc-
tion of the attribution of the Report by the King's Advocate to Christopher Robinson.)
